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Iran's Nuclear Program
Johnson Lin
for Peace, the United States agreed to lease “Iran up
to 13.2 pounds of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for
research purposes” and also supplied a fivemegawatt reactor for the production of electricity. 1
In return for U.S. nuclear assistance, Iran signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on July 1,
1968, the first day the treaty was open for
signature.
The NPT originated from the international
community’s growing awareness of the inherent
dangers of the proliferation of nuclear arms. After
witnessing the destructiveness of nuclear weapons
against Japan during World War II, many believed
an increase in the number of countries with nuclear
weapons threatened global security. The treaty
served international security interests by advancing
nuclear non-proliferation, disarming and
dismantling existing nuclear weapons, and
advocating for peaceful nuclear development.2
Iran, having just initiated a meaningful nuclear
program, signed the treaty as a non-nuclear
signatory, agreeing not to acquire or manufacture
nuclear weapons, to accept safeguards that verified
nonproliferation obligations and to negotiate in
good faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms
race. These conditions were supposed to bar Iran,
and other non-nuclear states, from developing
nuclear weapons. In return for its agreement to
these provisions, under Article IV of the treaty, Iran
gained recognition of its “inalienable right…to
develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes” in accordance to
articles I and II.3 Iran’s signing of the NPT
publicly signified its intention to abstain from
developing nuclear weapons.
With a commitment to peaceful and
responsible nuclear development, Iran was able to
acquire nuclear assistance from Western states such
as France and Germany throughout the 1970s. The
nuclear program was a priority of Shah Reza
Pahlavi, Iran’s leader, because he believed that the
exploration and development of alternative forms

I. Introduction
The potential Iranian nuclear weapons
program is an issue of utmost concern to the
international community. Iran has been deemed by
the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of
terror, and it has the dangerous potential to use its
nuclear program to construct nuclear weapons.
Iranian leaders have consistently declared Iran’s
right to pursue peaceful nuclear technologies, but
they have not fully adhered to the international
inspections and regulations that are necessary to
ensure its peaceful nature. While there isn’t
irrefutable evidence linking Iran’s nuclear
advancement to nuclear weapons, many signs seem
to point in that direction.
The problem of Iran’s nuclear program fits
perfectly within the realist theory of international
relations. Despite the existence of the United
Nations and other multinational organizations,
realism argues that states exist in an anarchic
environment. Uncertainty about the capabilities
and intentions of Iran’s nuclear program creates
serious security dilemmas for the international
community, particularly the U.S. and Israel. The
international community has acted to thwart Iran’s
suspect nuclear weapons program. Some of the
options available can be successful and others are
doomed to fail. Understanding the history of Iran’s
nuclear program is necessary for understanding
how the international community ought deal with
this potentially deadly problem.
II. History of Iran’s nuclear program
Iran’s nuclear program began in 1957 through
the United States “Atoms for Peace” program.
Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the
program promoted the development of safe and
peaceful nuclear technologies. It strengthened the
alliance between the two, which was vital to U.S.
national security interests because of the Cold War
and Iran’s strategic location on the border between
the Soviet Union and the Middle East. President
Eisenhower sought to increase military, economic,
and civilian assistance to gain a greater strategic
position with Iran. The aid to Iran’s nuclear
program grew from U.S. national security interests,
an example of international realism. Under Atoms
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of energy production was necessary for the Iranian
economy given the economic uncertainty resulting
from regional wars that disrupted Iran’s oil
production and from predictions of looming energy
shortfalls.4 Instability in the Middle East in the
1970s pushed Iran towards developing nuclear
energy, a means of meeting its energy demands
beyond oil. In March 1974, Iran announced its
plans to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity
from nuclear power. This ambitious goal would
have been able to meet a great deal of Iran’s energy
needs, but the amount of nuclear energy necessary
to do so was also enough to produce about 600-700
nuclear warheads. 5 Iran’s growing ambitions about
the possibilities of a large nuclear program began to
rattle its partners around the world.
Despite the Shah’s assurance that his nuclear
program had only peaceful intentions, foreign
governments increasingly became reluctant to aid
Iranian nuclear development. A United States
special national intelligence estimate asserted, “The
ambitions of the Shah could lead Iran to pursue
nuclear weapons, especially in the shadow of
India’s nuclear test in May 1974.”6 Furthermore, in
an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde,
the Shah was quoted as saying that Iran would,
“sooner than is believed” be “in possession of a
nuclear bomb,” and Assadollah Alam, the Shah’s
court minister, claimed on several occasions that
the Shah wanted a nuclear bomb but found it
expedient to adamantly deny it at the time. 7 These
indications that Iran’s nuclear ambitions was
leaning towards more than merely energy
production pushed the U.S. towards taking a stiffer
approach against Iran.
By the time of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in the
late 1970s, France and Germany began
withdrawing their support of Iran’s nuclear
program. The chaos resulting from the revolution,
primarily the hostage crisis and the regime change
to a hostile Islamic republic, created a dangerous
situation that Western governments believed would
only be exacerbated with the inclusion of nuclear
technologies. During this period, Iran’s nuclear
program slowed dramatically. The deterioration of
the program was the result of a combination of
factors: the absence of foreign assistance, Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s opposition to nuclear

technology, the mass exodus of nuclear scientists,
and Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facility at
Osirak, which removed an immediate threat to
Iran.8 However, this break in Iran’s nuclear
development was ephemeral. It ended with the
death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the
subsequent ascension of Ayatollah Khamenei. This
change of Iran’s leadership changed the trajectory
of Iran’s nuclear desires.
Ayatollah Khamenei had much more of a
positive view of nuclear power than his
predecessor, and initiated plans to rebuild the
nuclear program in Tehran. In the 1991 Gulf War
against Iraq, coalition forces, of which Iran was not
a participant, discovered a clandestine Iraqi nuclear
program. With the increase of a Western presence
in the Persian Gulf and the real possibility of Iraqi
nuclear armament, Iran perceived increasing
security threats. With a neighboring rival having
almost developed nuclear weapons, and Western
powers exerting influence in the region, Iran
believed that it could no longer depend on its
traditional non-nuclear defenses.9 Following the
tenets of realism, insecurity pushed Iran to further
develop an indigenous nuclear program.
In addition to defense, nuclear weapons would
also useful for Iranian attainment of regional
hegemony. Iran remembers the glories of the
ancient Persian Empire, which was decimated by
raiding Arabs, who were spreading Islam across the
region. Iranians beam with nationalism and see
themselves as separate and superior to neighboring
Arabs. This is evident in Iran’s adherence to Shi’a
Islam as opposed to the Sunni sect popular among
Arabs. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the
Middle East was no longer a battleground between
superpowers. New regional leaders could emerge,
and a functional Iranian nuclear weapon would
cement Iran’s superiority over its Arab rivals and
leadership in the region. In order to construct
nuclear weapons, Iran has received assistance from
non-Western states such as Russia, China, Pakistan,
and North Korea.10
As Iran accelerated its development of nuclear
technologies in the 1990s, it began moving astray
from its commitments as a signatory to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. With insufficient
oversight from the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), Iran developed “a vast network of
uranium mines, enrichment plants, conversion sites,
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greater in size than those indigenous to Iran14. This
relationship between Iran and North Korea is
extremely alarming given North Korea’s status as
the only state to have officially withdrawn from the
NPT, and to have developed nuclear weapons after
signing the treaty. Iran’s dependence on North
Korea may be a signal of its intentions to follow a
similar path of nuclear development.
It is also believed that Iran gained some
nuclear assistance from Pakistan. Abdul Qadeer
Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, had
operated an international nuclear black market in
the 1990s. In 2004, he confessed to this network of
proliferation, and is believed to have contacted and
sold centrifuges and blueprints to Iran in 1994.
Following his confession, Pakistan took steps to
neutralize Khan’s network to safeguard its nuclear
weapons and technologies. However, there is still
concern that parts of Khan’s black market network
could still be open, and that Iran is the most active
customer in the nuclear black market. Iran’s access
to nuclear materials beyond the supervision of the
international community is a source of concern.15
In recent years, the international community
has become increasingly alarmed at the potential of
a nuclear-armed Iran. Western intelligence
agencies have attained large amounts of
information that “provide snapshots of an extensive
and sophisticated weapons program whose goal is
to produce a uranium implosion device.”16 In
response to criticisms and accusations of its nuclear
ambitions, Iran consistently declares its sovereign
right to pursue nuclear technology. This pursuit of
nuclear technology has gotten alarmingly close to
nuclear capability, and Israeli intelligence estimates
that with the current rate of Iran’s development, it
is about three years away from developing a
nuclear weapon.17 Many believe that Iranian
nuclear weapons are imminent. While a nucleararmed Iran would be a threat to the entire
international community, Israel would face the

and research reactors” and constructed other
nuclear facilities, to supply domestically produced
nuclear fuels. This immense network of uranium
production now allows Iran to produce an estimated
2.77 kg of low-enriched uranium per day. 11 Due to
Iranian duplicity, diplomatic stalling, and
unwillingness from the international community to
enforce the conditions of the NPT in a meaningful
way, Iran has been uninhibited in its enrichment of
uranium “on a scale that cannot plausibly be meant
to produce fuel for a nuclear power reactor but
could be used to produce the fissile material for a
nuclear weapon.”12 In addition to the large scale of
Iran’s nuclear development, the nuclear program
has been kept extremely secretive. This secrecy
seems indicative of intent to hide aspects of a
nuclear program that are unacceptable to the
international community. If it were completely
peaceful, it could likely gain foreign assistance in
return for international oversight. Iran consistent
refusal of international oversight, despite the
possible benefits of it, signals that its nuclear
ambitions are not completely peaceful.
Despite speculations of Iran’s intention to
construct nuclear weapons, there isn’t any
conclusive evidence proving it. There is
uncertainty about its intentions because the
“existing means of detecting, determining, and
enforcing violations of safeguard obligations, and
the will to do so, are inadequate for the task.”13
The IAEA is incapable of decisively determining
Iranian intentions. While unlikely, in light of the
lack of evidence, it is still a possibility that Iran’s
nuclear technology will pursue strictly peaceful
purposes. Iranian antagonism towards international
interference in its nuclear development may be
more indicative of its distrust of the international
community rather than of its intentions of secretly
constructing nuclear weapons.
Iran’s current nuclear technology and weapons
technology necessary for the transportation of
possible nuclear warheads is largely based on
foreign assistance, particularly from North Korea.
North Korean technicians and military experts have
supported Iran’s path to achieve nuclear bomb
capability and have aided in increasing the range of
its ballistic missiles. A majority of Iran’s nuclear
centrifuges are primarily based on North Korean
designs, which are more technically advanced and
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greatest security threats from Iran, aptly expressed
in current Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s
persistent anti-Zionist rhetoric. In 2006, during the
war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon,
Ahmadinejad said in regards to the conflict, “…the
main solution is for the elimination of the Zionist
regime” because Israel “is an illegitimate regime,
there is no legal basis for its existence.”18
Along with President Ahmadinejad’s harsh
rhetoric, Iran’s weapons capabilities have greatly
increased in recent years, and now pose a serious
threat to Israel’s national security. Its advanced
weapons are seen as a precursor to greater military
ambitions that include nuclear weapons. In 2008,
Iran test-fired nine missiles, including an advanced
version of the Shahab-3, a medium-range ballistic
missile. It reportedly has a range of up to 2,000
kilometers, and can be armed with a conventional
high-explosive warhead, a chemical warhead,
submunitions warhead, or a nuclear warhead. 19 The
Shahab-3 missiles can theoretically carry possible
Iranian nuclear warheads to Israel, placing Israel in
a very precarious situation. As such, Israel is often
the most assertive member of the international
community in calls for actions to stop Iranian
nuclear development. Regardless of whether or not
there is international support, Israel may act
unilaterally to stop Iran’s nuclear program.
Under the assumption that Iran is in fact
developing nuclear weapons, the international
community has sought to implement means of
disrupting Iran’s nuclear advancement. Multilateral
and unilateral, specifically Israeli, approaches have
been discussed. Some efforts, such as sanctions
and covert operations, have already been
implemented. Others, such as preventive strike and
regime change, are viable options in the near future.
These options approach the problem from different
perspectives and are not mutually exclusive.
Regardless of which options are taken against Iran,
success must be measured not only in whether Iran
is able to construct nuclear weapons, but also cost
to the quality of life of the Iranian population, and
the potential of escalation to war.

III. Option 1 - Accept proliferation
Although many believe that the dangers posed
by allowing Iran to continue its nuclear program
demand international actions preventing its
construction of nuclear weapons, the potential
dangers may be overblown. The fact that there
isn’t any conclusive evidence about the purpose of
Iran’s nuclear program must be emphasized. Also,
recent events in the Middle East and within Iran
have triggered a de-emphasis on the nuclear
program as Iranian leaders seek to satisfy economic
demands by its public. Moreover, even if Iran were
to develop nuclear weapons, it may not be any
more threatening to the international community
than it currently is. The option of inaction, and
thereby allowing Iran to continue its nuclear
program with the possibility of its constructing a
nuclear weapon, is one that needs to be seriously
considered by the international community.
With the unrest across the Middle East and
rising inflation in Iran, Iran’s nuclear program is
not currently a priority for its leaders. 2011 has
been a year in which the Iranian regime has placed
greater emphasis on its domestic agenda because of
rising inflation resulting from recent cuts to
government subsidies on gasoline, fuel, and bread.
With public outcries against its dampened
economy, developing nuclear technology has
become less urgent for the regime. Inflation is “not
at 10 percent but perceived by average Iranians to
be 50 percent.”20 Sanctions on Iran have restricted
its economy, forcing it to divert resources and
attention away from producing a nuclear arsenal
and towards dealing with its economy. A deemphasized nuclear program means that immediate
forceful action is neither required nor prudent. The
pressures on its economy may force Iran to work
with foreign states, opening the door to solving the
nuclear problem diplomatically. Iran’s nuclear
advancement does not appear to be a threat in the
immediate future.
On the other hand, even if de-emphasized,
Iran’s nuclear program is still a serious threat in the
long run. If the international community allows
Iran to continue its nuclear program and it
successfully produces nuclear weapons, the
international community fears that Iran will have
increased coercive influence over its neighboring
states. These fears may be unfounded since
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Sean Yoong, “Ahmadinejad: Destroy Israel, End
Crisis,” Washington Post (August 3, 2006)
19
BBC News, “Iran sends missile test warning” (July 9,
2008)
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Scott Peterson, “New Year priorities: Tehran focused
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coercion backed by threats of nuclear weapons
historically have not been more successful than
coercion without such threats. For example, the
United States’ nuclear arsenal did not enhance the
effectiveness of its demands of North Korea to
release the USS Pueblo in 1968, Israeli threats
against Syria prior to the 1982 Lebanon War were
unsuccessful, and British threats against Argentina
over the Falkland Islands in 1982 failed despite its
possession of nuclear arms.21 One possible reason
for the ineffectiveness of nuclear-backed threats is
that the state threatened understands the
unlikeliness of the actual use of nuclear weapons.
Deterrents are ineffective unless the opposition
believes that the threat is real and imminent. Any
possible use of nuclear weapons would universally
be condemned by the international community and
would lead to serious repercussions, thereby
neutralizing the threat. Following historical trends,
Iran’s possible nuclear weapons would not increase
its coercive influence over regional neighbors.
Another fear of a nuclearized Iran is its
potential to unleash a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East. Secretary of State Clinton and Vice
President Biden have both warned “Iran’s actions
risk sparking a nuclear arms race in the Middle
East.”22 While this is a possibility, it is also an
overstated danger. There are only a handful of
countries in the region, such as Libya, Syria, and
Saudi Arabia, which have the technological
capacity and the economic wherewithal to develop
a meaningful nuclear program. Some of these
states have previously had nuclear programs but
have since given them up. Even if nuclear arms
proliferated in the region, the real danger is not
necessarily nuclear proliferation, but from a nuclear
conflict.23 The dangers of nuclear arms are not
necessarily inherent, but result from their use.
Although Israel would be the most likely
target of Iranian nuclear weapons, history indicates
that nuclear proliferation has the effect of deterring
nuclear wars rather than provoking them. Nuclear
states may still conflict with one another, but
nuclear weapons have never been brought into the
conflict. For example, during the Cold War,
neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. used their massive

stash of nuclear weapons. In the current state of
Indian-Pakistani relations, the two have not used
nuclear arms despite mutual animosities. While
these states conflict with one another, both sides
understand the dire consequences of a nuclear
attack. Pax Atomica, the theory of mutually
assured destruction, deters the use of nuclear
weapons. It is unlikely that nuclear war between
Iran and Israel would occur even if Iran were to
develop nuclear arms. Nuclear war between the
two would be too dangerous and the notion of
mutually assured destruction would encourage
greater prudence in their bilateral relations. Iranian
leaders understand that if they were to use nuclear
arms, it would be reciprocated leading to massive
destruction on both sides. This diminishes the
likelihood of a nuclear conflict.
Although it is unlikely that Iran will use any
nuclear weapons it possibly develops, a major fear
is that the weapons will fall into the hands of
terrorists. The proliferation of nuclear arms may
spread to Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or other groups. In
1998, the U.S. Justice Department charged that
Osama bin Laden called for “al-Qaeda to put aside
its differences with Shi’ite Muslim terrorist
organizations, including the government of Iran and
its affiliated terrorist group Hezbollah, to cooperate
against their perceived common enemy, the United
States and its allies.” Iran has indirectly supplied alQaeda and its affiliated groups with resources in
their mutual war against the United States.
However, it is unlikely that Iran would directly
supply al-Qaeda with a nuclear weapon. The two
share a common enemy, but also have divergent
ideologies. Iran promotes Shi’a fundamentalist
movements in the Middle East, while al-Qaeda is a
Sunni jihadist movement. Iran would much more
likely share its nuclear weapons with Hezbollah, a
terrorist organization essentially created by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards. Hezbollah has caused
several conflicts with Israel since its founding in
the 1980s and Iran has several weapons smuggling
routes to the group that can be used to smuggle
nuclear warheads to Hezbollah. Neither al-Qaeda
nor Hezbollah has demonstrated reluctance in the
possibility of using nuclear weapons.
The potential of terrorists groups using
Iranian-developed nuclear weapons is a very deadly
one, and is the most dangerous aspect of accepting
proliferation. This may be the best argument
against allowing Iran to continue its nuclear
program. However dangerous this threat is, the
possibility of it actually occurring is low when
considering the reasons why Iran wants nuclear

21

Matthew Fuhrmann & Todd S. Sechser, “Would a
nuclear-armed Iran really be so dangerous?” Christian
Science Monitor (January 12, 2011)
22
BBC News, “US leader Biden says Iran may spark
nuclear arms race” (May 6, 2010)
23
Stephen M. Walt, “Iran, arms races, and war,” Foreign
Policy (October 1, 2009)
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weapons. If the construction of nuclear weapons
were key to Iran’s regional hegemony, terrorist use
of those weapons would surely diminish Iran’s
leadership in the region and would instead solidify
Iran’s status as a dangerous pariah state. The use of
its nuclear weapons would be counterproductive to
Iran’s interests, and it would be in its best interest
not to allow terrorist organizations to use it. 24
An Iranian nuclear weapons program is more
likely to be used for defensive rather than offensive
purposes. One of the key reasons for Iranian
nuclear ambitions is perceived threats in the region.
With the 2011 NATO air strikes in Libya, some see
nuclear weapons as the only useful deterrent
against foreign intervention. The North Korean
regime has stated “Libya’s dismantling of its
nuclear weapons program has made it vulnerable to
military intervention by the West.” Halting a
nuclear program is seen as a bait and switch
approach that left Libya defenseless against
consequent Western attacks. 25 Iran’s regime, with
close nuclear ties to North Korea, likely has a
common understanding of the use of nuclear
weapons as a deterrent against the West. With an
increasing foreign presence in the Middle East, Iran
sees its nuclear program as the only means of
providing defense against perceived hostilities.
The option of accepting proliferation may not
be as dangerous as is often assumed. While
proliferation of nuclear weapons is dangerous, a
nuclear-armed Iran will not likely be any more
dangerous than any other nuclear-armed state.
Based on historical precedents, Iran will not have
any more coercive influence over its neighbors, nor
will it start a nuclear conflict. It is possible that a
nuclearized Iran would ignore historical precedent
and launch a nuclear war, but in reality, Iran’s
leaders should be too rational to actually do so.
The only serious threat of Iranian nuclear weapons
is that terrorist organizations may procure and use
them. However, this would run counter to Iran’s
interests. Instead, nuclear weapons will most likely
be used for defenses against Western threats.
Allowing Iran to construct a nuclear weapon,
through inaction from the international community,
is an option that needs to be considered by world
leaders.

IV. Option 2 - Sanctions
Sanctions have been supported on a unilateral
and multilateral basis as a means for curbing
Iranian access to nuclear materials necessary and
dissuading it from developing nuclear weapons.
Despite Iran’s persistent claims that its nuclear
program is strictly for peaceful purposes, its
development seems to go beyond what is necessary
for mere energy production. The goal of sanctions
is to put pressure on Iran’s ability to continue its
nuclear program. Sanctions are a method of “hard”
power and they operate within the framework of
international liberalism, which emphasizes
diplomacy as the solution to international problems.
While sanctions do have an effect in delaying
nuclear development, thus far, they have not been
very effective in suppressing Iran’s ambitions for
nuclear weapons.
On July 31, 2006, the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 1696, which “demanded that
Iran suspend all enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities,” including research and
development, and gave it one month to do so or
face the possibility of economic and diplomatic
sanctions.26 Iran refused to comply with this
resolution. Facing Iranian defiance, the Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1737 on
December 23, 2006, which imposed “sanctions on
Iran’s trade in sensitive nuclear materials and
technology.”27 This tougher round of sanctions
demanded that Iran halt its uranium enrichment
program within 60 days, with threats of further
sanctions. Again, Iran defied the will of the
Security Council, so following the 60-day grace
period the Security Council passed Resolution 1747
on March 24, 2007. This intensified the previous
sanctions, named specific officials as the targets of
the sanctions, and added additional sanctions
against Iranian financial institutions.28 On March 3,
2008, the U.N. passed Resolution 1803, which
reaffirmed the previous sanctions and asserted
greater IAEA rights to verify information provided
to it by Iran.29 With Iran continuing its violations
26

Security Council 5500th Meeting (AM), “Security
Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment
by 31 August, Or Face Possible Economic,
Diplomatic Sanctions” (July 31, 2006)
27
Global Policy Forum, “UN Sanctions Against Iran”
28
Ibid.
29
Security Council 5848th Meeting (PM), “Security
Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran’s ProliferationSensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance Over

24

Steven Emerson & Joel Himelfarb, “Would Iran
Provide A Nuclear Weapon to Terrorists?” in Focus
Quarterly 3 (Winter 2009)
25
Mark McDonald, “North Korea Suggests Libya
Should Have Kept Nuclear Program,” New York
Times (March 24, 2011)
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The close proximity between the nuclear facility
and Iran’s military institution gives further
credence to the belief that it is being used for
military and weapons purposes. Sanctions failed to
stop Iranian construction of new nuclear facilities,
and seem incapable of altering its hostile behavior.
Following the exposure of the Qom facility
and with increasing fears of more undisclosed
nuclear facilities, the international community felt
greater urgency in developing stricter sanctions to
limit Iran’s access to nuclear materials and
technologies. The U.S. has sought to build a
stronger coalition in the U.N. to strengthen future
sanctions. In the past, China and Russia, two vetoholding members of the Security Council, have
resisted calls for tough, multilateral sanctions.
China, an increasingly self-confident power on the
world stage uses “its diplomatic weight to protect
countries that Beijing considers to be its allies.”34
It considers Iran an ally out of economic
convenience because it has sought increased trade
with Iran, particularly in the sale of oil, which is in
great demand because of China’s rapid
development. Russia has also argued against the
use of sanctions on the grounds that sanctions are
counterproductive because they force Iran to be
more secretive. Instead, it believes that “all efforts
must be focused on supporting the negotiating
process.”35
Following the discovery of Qom, China and
Russia began cooperating with the West on the Iran
issue. With their support, the Security Council was
able to pass Resolution 1929, which was much
stricter than previous sanctions by expanding
sanctions with hopes of applying pressure on the
Iranian economy. In order for more successful
sanctions, there must be greater support from the
rotating members of the Security Council who have
traditionally called for softer methods of
engagement with Iran. Members of the 2010
Security Council, such as Brazil, Turkey, and
Lebanon advocated for the use of diplomacy rather
than sanctions. They argued “the sanctions that
have been slapped on Iran have not made the
Iranian government more responsive to the
demands of the Security Council and the IAEA.
However, these sanctions have caused Iranian

of international calls for an end to its nuclear
program, the U.N. passed Resolution 1929 on June
9, 2010. This resolution imposed additional
sanctions, expanded an arms embargo, and
tightened restrictions on “financial and shipping
enterprises related to ‘proliferation-sensitive
activities.’”30
These sanctions have seemingly succeeded in
complicating Iran’s ability to further develop its
nuclear program, but have failed to change Iran’s
behavior. Iran continues to assert its right to enrich
uranium without external interference. In response
to international criticisms, Iran has argued that “the
countries that have backed sanctions have provided
no evidence” to prove that it hopes to construct
nuclear weapons and it points to a 2007 U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate that declared that
Iran had ended its nuclear weapons research in
2003.31 The fact of the matter is that although its
excessively large amounts of uranium enriched is
suspicious, that alone is not sufficient proof that
Iran is aiming towards nuclear arms. Iran has
continued to demonstrate its unwillingness to allow
foreign states to determine what it claims is a
purely domestic issue. With a great deal of
assistance from North Korea, Iran is not dependent
on the West for nuclear assistance. Thus, sanctions
that limit Iranian trade of nuclear materials and
technologies with participating U.N. states have
had little effect on Iran’s program.
The failure of sanctions is evident by the
September 2009 revelations about the construction
of a uranium enrichment facility buried inside a
mountain near the city of Qom. 32 This facility,
which can hold approximately 3,000 centrifuges, is
disturbing because it appears to be directly aimed at
developing nuclear weapons. Iran has openly
admitted that the site is too small for peaceful
civilian purposes, leading the international
community to believe that it will be used for arms
development. Additionally, the facility is “located
in an underground tunnel complex on the grounds
of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Base.”33
Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo” (March 3,
2008)
30
Security Council 6335th Meeting (AM), “Security
Council Imposes Additional Sanctions On Iran,
Voting 12 In Favour To 2 Against, With 1
Abstention” (June 9, 2010)
31
Global Policy Forum, “UN Sanctions Against Iran”
32
Ibid.
33
Nima Gerami & James M. Acton, “What Else Is Iran
Hiding?” Foreign Policy (September 28, 2009)

34

Louis Charbonneau, “Analysis – More Iran steps seen
tougher sell on new UN council,” Reuters Africa
(December 31, 2010)
35
Megan K. Stack, “Russia opposes tougher sanctions
against Iran,” Los Angeles Times (October 14, 2009)
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civilians much hardship.”36 Members of the 2011
Security Council, such as India and South Africa,
have also demonstrated reluctance towards
increasing new rounds of sanctions on Iran, which
would be targeted the Iranian energy sector.37 They
oppose sanctions on the grounds that they would
severely disrupt the international oil markets. For
developing economies, maintaining Iran’s oil
output is of greater importance than the addressing
the threat of nuclear weapons. Nuclear
proliferation is not as serious of a concern for the
developing world as it is for the developed world.
Developing countries are more concerned with
economic development rather than insecurity from
the nuclear powers. Iran’s oil production is its
trump card against calls for stricter economic
sanctions. The countries that oppose further
sanctions against Iran question the legitimacy and
efficacy of the sanctions. While the developing
countries on the Security Council have expressed
hesitation in applying sanctions, President Obama’s
openness to engagement with Iran will help to
ensure that India, South Africa, China, and Russia
keep an open mind in regards to further U.N.
sanctions.38
The consensus amongst the U.S. and its allies
is that multilateral sanctions have slowed Iran’s
nuclear program and its suspected effort to develop
nuclear weapons. Officials in the United States,
Europe and Asia believe that their international
campaign “has restricted Iran’s ability to procure
the raw materials needed to build an atomic bomb,”
particularly “carbon fiber and a particular highstrength steel.”39 The inability to acquire these
materials has stalled Tehran’s efforts of
constructing advanced centrifuge machines that
could accelerate the enrichment of uranium for
nuclear weapons. While sanctions have slowed
Iran’s uranium enrichment, it is clear that by no
means have they achieved their goal of subduing
Iran’s ability to construct nuclear arms. Estimates
from the U.S. and Israel show that Iran “already has
enough low-enriched uranium stockpiled to create
as many as four atomic weapons.”40 There is also

the worry that Iran could possibly have advanced
centrifuges at nuclear facilities that are unknown to
the IAEA. Israel still suspects that Iran will be able
to build a nuclear weapon within the coming few
years. Sanctions are unable extinguish the
ambitions for nuclear weapons, which is largely
based on security concerns and hegemonic desires.
Instead, all it can do is slow Iran’s process by
limiting its access to the nuclear materials market.
If Iran wants nuclear weapons, sanctions alone will
not be able to prevent it from doing so.
V. Option 3 - Covert Operations
In addition to sanctions, covert operations
have been used to slow Iran’s nuclear program by
sabotaging nuclear equipment and diminishing
expertise. Covert operations against Iran’s nuclear
facilities have utilized cyber-attacks against nuclear
facilities, and attacks against Iranian nuclear
scientists. Given the nature of covert operations, it
is unknown what specific actions have been taken
and their effectiveness. Known covert operations
against Iran’s nuclear program are the Stuxnet
computer worm, and the Mossad’s assassinations of
Iranian scientists.
Stuxnet, known as the world’s first cyber
missile, is a computer worm that is designed to
destroy the power supplies used in nuclear fuelrefining centrifuge systems. It is a very mysterious
computer virus because of its encrypted nature and
unknown origins. A Belarus antivirus company
discovered it in June 2010 and its purpose of
destroying specific nuclear targets was not
understood until September of that year. While the
origins of the worm are still unknown, many
computer scientists, nuclear experts, and former
intelligence officials believe that Stuxnet is a joint
project between the Americans and the Israelis,
possibly with some help, from the Germans and the
British.41 In the last year of his presidency,
President George W. Bush “authorized new covert
action intended to sabotage Iran’s suspected effort
to develop nuclear weapons.”42 This authorized
covert action is believed to be the origins of the
development of Stuxnet.
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the damaged parts despite sanctions against Iran’s
purchase of equipment used in uranium enrichment.
According to an anonymous Western diplomat with
access to confidential IAEA reports, Iran seems to
be have been able to “maintain a constant, stable
output” of low-enriched uranium despite the
damage to the centrifuges. In fact, a February 2011
IAEA report shows that Iran maintained “steady or
even slightly elevated production rates” at the
Natanz enrichment plant in 2010. The damage to
Iranian equipment had little to no lasting effect on
the rate of Iran’s uranium enrichment.46
Although Iran seemed to have been able to
easily and quickly replace the damaged centrifuges,
Stuxnet was not a complete failure. Iran is believed
to have only “finite supplies of certain kinds of
high-tech metals needed to make the machines” due
to the trade restrictions from the U.N. sanctions.47
The forced replacement of the Natanz centrifuges
strains Iran’s limited amount of nuclear supplies,
and also diminishes its ability to construct new
machines. Furthermore, the specificity of the
worm’s encoding seems to imply that its designers
had intimate knowledge of the Iran’s centrifuges.
Despite Iran’s attempted veil of secrecy
surrounding its nuclear program, Stuxnet
demonstrates the level of foreign intelligence about
Iran’s nuclear program. International computer
analysts who have examined the worm believe that
it was created with access to inside information.
Moreover, the computers at Natanz that control the
centrifuges are not connected to the Internet, which
means that Stuxnet could only have been
introduced through a hand-held USB device. 48
Natanz, and possibly other nuclear facilities, must
have been infiltrated by foreign intelligence
agencies. Iran’s cloak of secrecy has failed to
protect its nuclear program from foreign
interference.
In addition to the Stuxnet cyber-attacks, the
Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, is believed to
have implemented assassination plots against key
Iranian nuclear scientists. On November 29, 2010,
Majid Shahriari, Iran’s top nuclear scientist and
senior manager of Iran’s nuclear effort, was killed
when “an explosive charge placed in his car was
detonated by remote control after he climbed into

Following its complex trail, researchers in
California and Germany have discovered how
Stuxnet operates. They believe that the worm gains
access to computer systems using an array of
devious exploits. Upon entry, it “searches for and
infects only a specific Siemens-made
programmable logic controller (PLC) performing
specific functions.” Upon finding these targets, the
worm hunts for “identification numbers unique to a
special kind of ‘frequency converter drive’ made by
only two firms in the world: one headquartered in
Finland, the other in Tehran.” Of these frequency
converter drives, Stuxnet only targets those
operating at speeds resembling those that
centrifuges must achieve in order to separate and
concentrate uranium to produce nuclear fuel. The
worm can either bring these centrifuges to “a
grinding slowdown or an explosive surge” by
forcing it to constantly swing its speeds from
extremes for a long period, which causes the
centrifuge to break down. 43
In 2009, Stuxnet hit Iran’s uranium enrichment
facility at Natanz, home to about 5,000 centrifuges.
The worm damaged and forced the replacement of
about 1,000 centrifuges. Through IAEA cameras
installed at the plant, U.N. inspectors recorded
“workers hauling away crate after crate of broken
equipment.”44 Initially, analysts who studied the
Stuxnet attack on Natanz estimated that the attack
set Iran’s nuclear program back two years. They
claimed, “this was nearly as effective as a military
strike, but even better since there are no fatalities
and no full-blown war. From a military
perspective, this was a huge success.”45 The worm
was able to destroy Iranian machines and its
unknown origins prevent the Iranian regime from
retaliating.
Despite the initial enthusiasm about the
efficacy of Stuxnet in slowing Iran’s nuclear
program, it appears that the worm was less
effective against the nuclear program than believed.
Following the attack, Iranian scientists engaged in a
“feverish – and apparently successful – effort” to
contain the damage done by Stuxnet and to replace
43
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the vehicle.”49 The details of this assassination are
characteristic of the Mossad, which has carried out
similar plots in the past. The effects of Shahriari’s
assassination have been twofold: it caused the
immediate loss of “operational expertise and
detailed knowledge of an effort that has gone on for
decades” and has also served as a threat to other
scientists working on Iran’s nuclear program.50 In
addition to Shahriari’s assassination, Ali
Mohammadi, an Iranian quantum physics expert,
was killed when a bomb exploded near his house.
Many suspect that these assassinations were
committed by the Mossad. Both Shahriari and
Mohammadi were Iranian participants to the
Sesame project, a scientific study of atomic
structures that brings together scientists from Israel,
Arab states, and Iran.51 It is likely that is through
the Sesame project that the Israelis came into
contact with the key Iranian nuclear scientists. The
Mossad’s assassinations of nuclear scientists have
diminished Iran’s intellectual supply of scientists
needed for a successful nuclear program.
In conjunction with the Mossad’s attacks
against Iranian nuclear scientists, the United States
has worked covertly to prevent Iranian construction
of nuclear weapons. In 2007, the U.S. escalated
covert operations in Iran through the C.I.A. and the
Joint Special Operations Command. These
operations were primarily designed to destabilize
the Iranian regime through support of dissident
organizations and to gather undermine Iran’s
nuclear program. While the exact nature of U.S.
involvement in Iran is unknown to the public, it
correlated to an increase in violence in Iran.52
Publicly known covert operations have been
successful in limiting Iran’s access to nuclear
technology and operational knowledge. Because of
its clandestine nature, covert operations are
advantageous because they do not force Iranian
retaliation. They are effective tools for disrupting
Iran’s nuclear progress beyond the public eye,
decreasing the pressure on Iranian leaders to
retaliate. Yoel Guzansky, former head of the Iran
desk on the Israeli National Security Council,
praises covert operations as the moderate option
between sanctions and a use of military force

because it delays Iran’s actions and creates time for
sanctions and diplomacy to work.53 Covert
operations have successfully slowed aspects of
Iran’s nuclear development, but have not yet
completely stopped it. They may be incapable of
changing Iranian motives for much of the same
reasons sanctions can’t. They do not address Iran’s
desires for nuclear weapons, but instead merely
places hurdles between Iran’s nuclear program and
the capability to construct weapons.
VI. Option 4 - Preventive strike
As opposed to the safer options of sanctions
and covert operations, preventive strike is a very
controversial and risky option proposed for dealing
with Iran’s nuclear program. The most likely form
of a preventive strike would be an air raid against
key Iranian nuclear sites to destroy enough
centrifuges and other nuclear machines. The most
likely candidates to conduct such attacks are Israel
and the United States. Israel, when threatened, has
a history of preventively attacking facilities in the
Middle East believed to be a part of a nuclear
weapons program. In 1981, Israel struck Iraq’s
nuclear facilities in Osirak, and in 2007, attacked
Syria’s Deir Ezzor Research Station. The U.S.,
under both the Bush and Obama administrations,
has stated reluctance towards the use force against
Iran’s nuclear program, in spite of encouragement
to do so by some Arab allies. Israel, on the other
hand, has the military capability to unilaterally
destroy Iranian nuclear facilities and appears to be
seriously considering it. Preventive strikes are the
quintessential course of action within the realism
paradigm. Uncertain of Iranian motives, Israel may
use the option of eliminating the threat through use
of force.
Israel’s history of preventive strikes against
enemy nuclear facilities gives important insight into
potential future strikes on Iran. In 1981, Iraq was
in the midst of constructing a 70-megawatt
uranium-powered reactor at Osirak, a facility that
Israeli intelligence believed was designed for the
production of nuclear weapons. Acknowledging
Iraq’s history of aggression against Israel, Israel
decided to use its air force to prevent Iraq from
attaining nuclear arms. On June 7, 1981, Israeli F15 interceptors and F-16 fighter-bombers struck
and decimated the Osirak nuclear reactor near
Baghdad, about 700 miles from Israel. Justifying
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this air strike, the Israeli government stated, “the
atomic bombs which that reactor was capable of
producing whether from enriched uranium or from
plutonium, would be of the Hiroshima size. Thus a
mortal danger to the people of Israel progressively
arose.”54 The potential for such a deadly weapon
falling into the hands of Israel’s enemies justified
the use of force for self-defense, and this
justification would apply to any preventive strikes
on Iran. While Israel was able to successfully
destroy the Osirak reactor relatively easily,
preventive strikes were by no means successful in
curtailing Iraq’s nuclear weapons program in the
long run.
The strike against Osirak was successful in the
immediate destruction of the Osirak nuclear
reactor. While important, a reactor is not an
entirely essential part of a successful nuclear
weapons program. The Iraqis “would have needed
to construct a separate plutonium reprocessing
plant” if it were interested in immediately attaining
nuclear weapons.55 There was no evidence of Iraq
having a plutonium reprocessing plant or that it had
plans to construct one in the immediate future. The
strike against the Osirak nuclear reactor was
unnecessary because Iraq wasn’t in a position to
construct a nuclear weapon. Israel prevented the
construction of nuclear weapons that was not yet
imminent. In doing so, the attacks revealed Israel’s
means of attack and its strong intent in doing so.
Rather than suppressing Iraq’s nuclear intentions,
the repercussions of the strikes were that they
forced Iraq to develop nuclear technology more
secretly, hampering Israeli intelligence of future
Iraqi nuclear developments.
A decade after the attacks on Osirak, the U.S.led coalition forces fought Iraq in the first Persian
Gulf War. After this conflict, U.N. inspectors
“unearthed a huge infrastructure for nuclear
development that had been completely unknown to
Western intelligence before the war.”56
Unbeknownst to the international community, Iraq
had secretly been developing a nuclear program
that came close to the production of a nuclear
weapon. The Israeli strikes against Osirak, while
delaying Iraq’s nuclear development a decade
earlier, did not deter Iraq from continuing its
nuclear program. The fact that Iraq was capable of

almost constructing nuclear weapons demonstrates
how preventive strikes failed to stop a nuclear
weapons program.
In an echo of the Osirak strike, Israel attacked
the Deir Ezzor Research Station in Syria in
September 2007. The targets of the attack was a
site that foreign intelligence analysts believed was a
partly constructed nuclear reactor that was
“modeled on one North Korea has used to create its
stockpile of nuclear weapon fuel.”57 It appeared to
have been the beginning stages of a Syrian nuclear
program with North Korean assistance. A senior
Israeli official speaking on the condition of
anonymity stated that the strike’s intention was to
“re-establish the credibility of our deterrent
power.”58 The message behind the strike against
the Syrian reactor, which did not pose an
immediate threat to Israel, seemed to be directed
towards Iran. It asserted Israel’s willingness to use
preventive force to assure its security.
While Israel has relied on the use of preventive
strikes against hostile nuclear-ambitious states in
the past, it is much less of an attractive option for
the current situation with Iran. Iran poses a
uniquely dangerous threat to Israel. It understands
Israeli military capabilities and its means of attacks.
In response to the potential of an Israeli air strike,
Iran’s nuclear program entails a large nuclear
complex that is carefully concealed, extensively
spread throughout the country, and provides
multiple routes to nuclear weapons capability.59
The immensity of the nuclear network and the
geographic diversity of its various facilities make
difficult the prospects of successfully halting the
nuclear program through preventive strikes. Unlike
Iraq and Syria, Iran’s nuclear program does not
provide a clear, singular target because it has
diversified the locations of its most critical nuclear
fissile material production sites. These critical
nuclear fissile material production sites are the
uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, the large
uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, and the
heavy water plant and plutonium production
reactors under construction at Arak. These facilities
are each about 950 to 1,000 miles away from Israel,
57
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supply of nuclear materials.62 However, its
construction is not yet complete, and it is possible
that those Arak will be infiltrated in the same
manner as Natanz. It is too early to contemplate
preventive strikes against Arak because it has yet to
be determined how large of a threat it actually
poses. Preventive strikes against Natanz and Arak
are neither currently necessary nor smart given that
they can be attacked in other ways. In the
immediate future, there isn’t much urgency for the
destruction of these nuclear missile production
sites.
While Israel’s air force has demonstrated its
capability of successfully destroying nuclear
facilities in Iraq and Syria, Iran poses strategic
difficulties. Israel needs U.S. cooperation in case
of an airstrike because it controls much of the air
space between Israel and Iran. This cooperation
may be difficult given the unpopularity of
preventive strikes. Iran also has greater means of
disrupting Israeli attacks. Iran’s air defense
capabilities consist of three elements: aircrafts,
surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery.63
While these defenses are technologically outdated,
with most dating back to before the Islamic
Revolution, they cannot be fully discounted. They
are still capable of disrupting the flight of Israeli
aircrafts. In addition to its outmoded air defense
system, the Iranian air force has forty modern MiG29s jet fighter aircrafts that can engage in air-to-air
combat with the Israeli air force. In any event,
Israel will not be able to strike Iran’s nuclear
facilities easily.
Despite Iran’s technological disadvantages, it
has two important advantages against an Israeli
airstrike in Iranian airspace. First, Iran’s aircrafts
would be operating in airspace near their docking
bases. This will allow them to carry more fuel than
their Israeli counterparts, giving them an edge
during instances of protracted air-to-air combat.
Second, Iranian aircrafts can rely on Ground
Control Intercept radars to disclose the position of
Israeli aircrafts. This would allow the Iranian air
force to begin engagement with its Israeli
adversaries from a favorable position, such as
attacking from behind.64 These advantages can
create difficulties for Israel if it were to decide to
attack Iranian nuclear sites.

the far end of the distance margin that Israeli
fighter planes can safely reach. These sites are
imperative to the success of a nuclear weapons
development, and “destruction of these facilities
would have the greatest impact on Tehran’s ability
to manufacture nuclear weapons.”60 In addition to
the difficulty of striking the numerous facilities
throughout Iran, the types of facilities discourage
any use of force.
The uranium conversion facility at Isfahan
would be a deadly target for a military strike
because of the nature of the site. It is estimated that
tons of uranium exist at Isfahan in chemical form,
and preventive strikes against this facility “could
result in the release of tons of UF6, UF4, and other
fluorine and uranium products into the
atmosphere,” which would very likely “result in
significant production of hydrofluoric acid, a highly
corrosive chemical” in the atmosphere.61
Unleashing this chemical into the atmosphere could
prove deadly for the 1.5 million residents of
Isfahan, Iran’s third largest city, and can affect the
lives of millions of people in the region. The
results of an attack on the Isfahan uranium
conversion facility would be detrimental to not only
Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions, but also to the
lives of millions of innocent people as well.
Like Isfahan, air strikes against Natanz and
Arak may not be necessary. Preventive strikes
against Natanz would not be dangerous in the same
ways as strikes against Isfahan would be.
However, preventive attacks may be superfluous
given Stuxnet’s infiltration of Natanz. The fact that
the worm must have been introduced manually by a
USB drive indicates that outside intelligence has
access to Natanz. It has been demonstrated that the
machines at Natanz can be attacked and destroyed
without the controversy of a preventive strike.
Arak is currently in the process of constructing a
heavy water plant and plutonium production
reactors. These heavy water reactors pose a great
risk of plutonium proliferation because those
produced by the Arak reactors would be weapons
grade. It is suspected that the Arak facility will be
used to recover plutonium from fuel spent in the
process of producing weapons-grade plutonium. A
reliable means of recovering nuclear fuel would be
vital for the successful construction of nuclear
weapons. Its destruction would “significantly slow
Iran’s future ability to plutonium” and limit Iran’s
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destruction of its most visible facilities if it chose to
do so. A clandestine Iranian nuclear program
would be even more dangerous to the international
community.
Ultimately, the likelihood of preventive strike
against Iran’s nuclear facilities must be understood
through the perspective of Israel’s leaders. Despite
the shortcomings of preventive strikes, Israel sees
the world within the theory of realism. With
uncertainty and constant security threats, Israel may
find preventive strikes as the only means of halting
the potential for Iranian nuclear weapons. Iran’s
threat to Israel must be understood in the context of
the Holocaust and Israeli existential concerns.
Iranian threats of annihilation may justify Israeli
use of force. While the rational deterrence theory
would theoretically prevent a nuclear war, the
Israeli leadership may not believe that it applies in
the case of Iran. Former Iranian President
Rafsanjani has said “the use of an atomic bomb
against Israel would destroy Israel completely
while [a nuclear attack] against the Islamic
countries would only cause damages.” Nuclear war
between the two may only assure the destruction of
Israel, and not Iran. This increases the pressure on
Israel to terminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program
before it achieve weapons capability. The
likelihood of preventive strikes hinges on the Israeli
leadership’s perception of the threat. Further
development of Iran’s nuclear program with
increased threats by Iranian leaders may force
Israeli military action.68

Prior to the pro-democracy protests across the
Middle East, several Arab states showed support
for preventive strikes against Iran. According to
U.S. State Department cables revealed by
WikiLeaks, Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, and
Bahrain lobbied for the U.S. to strike Iranian
nuclear facilities. Referring to Iran’s suspected
nuclear weapons program, Saudi King Abdullah
asked the U.S. to “cut off the head of the snake”
before it was too late. 65 Arab states that have
traditionally conflicted with Iran fear the power and
influence that nuclear weapons would afford Iran.
The cables also highlight “Israel’s anxiety to
preserve its regional nuclear monopoly” and its
readiness to strike Iran alone. 66 Arab states
neighboring Iran have shown support for preventive
attacks. Without Arab opposition to preventive
strikes against Iran, Israel may find unilateral
preventive strikes very appealing.
While they are advantageous in some respects,
preventive strikes are too risky to be carried out.
Israeli air strikes would likely overcome Iranian
defenses and succeed in the destroying Iranian
nuclear targets, but doing so will most likely
demand retaliation from the Iranians. Given Iran’s
views on Israel, tensions would rapidly escalate and
force Iran to launch counter attacks that can
escalate into an all-out war. War with Iran is
particularly perilous because it “has the largest and
most ideologically committed military of any state
in the Persian Gulf region. 67 In addition to the
Iranian military, in case of a war, Hamas and
Hezbollah, terrorist groups with close ties to Iran,
would likely assist Iran in inflicting catastrophic
damage to Israel. War with Iran will also further
complicate Israel’s prospects of peace with its
surrounding countries. These risks are not worth
the delaying of an Iranian nuclear program
preventive strikes are unable to suppress Iran’s
nuclear ambitions. They do not address the reasons
for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and could only slow
its nuclear advancement. Like Iraq, Iran can
covertly continue its nuclear development after the

VII. Option 5 - Regime Change
Regime change is an option to prevent Iran
from attaining nuclear weapons by replacing its
nuclear ambitious leaders with ones open to
diplomacy. Iran’s current nuclear program has
largely been designed by Ayatollah Khamenei and
galvanized by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
This regime zealously defends Iran’s right to
pursue nuclear technology, limits outside
knowledge of its nuclear development, and has
encouraged violence in the Middle East. Removing
these nuclear zealots from power would thwart
Iran’s ambitions for nuclear weapons.
Attempts at Iranian regime change can come
either internally or externally. External attempts to
overthrow the current Iranian regime are unlikely.
Israel, the state most threatened by the current
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Iranian regime, has demonstrated, at least publicly,
little interest in actively overthrowing Iran’s
government. Doing so would require the use of
military force and inevitably lead to a deadly,
protracted war and would disrupt the international
oil market, among other things. This would lead to
condemnation by many in the international
community. Overall, external changes to Iran’s
regime are not a viable option.
An internal regime change is conceivable, and
has become increasingly plausible given the current
unrest in the region. Iran has a history of
indigenous revolutions leading to dramatic regime
changes. In the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the
Iranian people rose up against the Shah, and
replaced the monarchy with a fundamentalist
Islamic republic. If Iran’s current regime were to
be replaced by one less hostile to the international
community, the issue of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons could be solved diplomatically. Iran’s
political climate since 2009 seems to indicate that
regime change towards democracy is a possibility.
In the disputed 2009 Iranian Presidential
election, Mir Hossein Mousavi, a reform candidate,
sought to “wrest the presidency and executive
power away from radical hard-liners whose term in
office had been marked by economic
incompetence, foreign-policy adventurism, and an
ideological doctrine that included limits on civil
right.”69 Following President Ahmadinejad’s
electoral victory, Mousavi and other opposition
candidates charged that the elections were rigged.
Supporters of opposition leaders organized the
Green Movement, with hopes of annulling the
presidential election. They began protesting in
several major cities. Despite the initial
peacefulness of the protests, they quickly turned
violent. There were numerous reports of “beatings
and murders of some demonstrators on Iran’s
street” by police forces and the Revolutionary
Guards.70 Violence against protestors transformed
the Green Movement from a movement against a
disputed election into a movement against
Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranian form of
government. With this development, Ayatollah
Khamenei “ordered a crackdown on any challenges
to his leadership.”71 Many key opposition leaders
understood that Khamenei was prepared to

massacre thousands of people, and were dissuaded
from organizing large protests. The increased
governmental use of force suppressed the 2009
Green Movement protests.
In 2011, following the success of
demonstrations in Tunisia that brought down
President Ben Ali and in Egypt against President
Mubarak, the Green Movement reinvigorated
protested throughout Iran. On February 14, 2011,
thousands of protestors gathered in the streets of
Tehran and other major Iranian cities to demand
greater democracy and governmental
accountability. However, unlike the preceding
protests in Tunisia and Egypt where the
governments were reluctant to use excessive force
against demonstrators, the Iranian regime resumed
its 2009 policy of forceful action to quell antigovernmental protests. The Revolutionary Guard
and other security forces were prepared to react
with force, and in some locations where protests
were planned, “witnesses reported that police
officers and baton-holding mercenaries
outnumbered the protested.”72 The state-sanctioned
violence against demonstrators was again
successful in subduing the protests, at least for the
time being.
In addition to its use of violence, the Iranian
government greatly restricted the impact of the
protests by cutting access between demonstrators
and opposition leaders. The two main opposition
leaders, Mir Hussein Moussavi and Mehdi
Karroubi, disappeared just prior to the February
14th protests. There were contradictory reports over
whether they had been jailed or had been placed
under extreme house arrest, completely cut off from
the outside world. 73 It is widely speculated that the
Iranian government detained the two with hopes of
containing the protest’s democratic fervor. If true,
this detention of opposition leaders is a risky course
of action for the Iranian regime. Cutting access to
opposition leaders can limit the strength and
direction of the demonstrators, but it can also
galvanize protestors by fueling their anger. Ali
Afshari, an exiled former student leader, believed
that there is fear in the Iranian government that
imprisoning the opposition leaders “would give
their restless supporters in the Green Movement a
72
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new cause to rally around.”74 The regime’s actions
for suppressing the protests may backfire and
engender greater protests, now and in the future.
In addition to the regime’s use of force against
Iranian protestors, Iran has also played a role in the
protests in nearby countries. It is deeply involved
in some protests and recognizes that its interests are
connected to the regional protests. One regime that
Iran is aiding is Syria, where pro-democracy
protests have turned violent. Iran has provided
Syria with the equipment necessary to disperse
protestors, block the Internet, and track cellphones.
These are the techniques that Iran uses to
successfully suppress its own protests. Iran’s
interest in buttressing the Syrian regime is due to
their shared ideology and Syria’s location, which
allows Iran to send weapons to Hezbollah and
Hamas. Because of the relationship between Iran
and Syria, the fall of the Syrian regime would likely
galvanize the protests for regime change in Iranian.
To protect itself from collapse, Iran’s regime is
protecting the Syrian regime. 75
While suppressing protests in Iran and Syria,
the regime has also fomented protests in Bahrain, a
small country with a Shi’a majority and a Sunni
regime. The protests have increasingly become a
proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. With
the collapse of the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain,
which is supported by Saudi Arabia, Iran would
gain greater influence in the region.76 The
replacement of a Sunni regime with a Shi’a one
would increase Iran’s clout of leadership. This
perception of regional leadership may decrease
public desire in Iran for regime change, and
increase the regime’s willingness to use force to
quell protests. Increased regional leadership would
encourage nationalism in Iran that would shield the
regime from some criticisms. Ultimately, it is
impossible to determine whether Iran’s antigovernment protests will succeed because events in
Iran are tied to events throughout the Middle East.
The success of the Iranian protesters partly depends
on the success of pro-democracy protests elsewhere
in the region.
If the Iranian opposition is successful in
overthrowing the current regime, the form and
ideology of any subsequent regimes is unclear.

While Iranian opposition leaders have embraced
democratic values, there isn’t a guarantee that these
values will materialize in a new regime. Even if
democratic, a new Iranian regime may continue the
current regime’s policies for nuclear development.
While a democratic government is likely be more
receptive to meaningful negotiations on the nuclear
issue with the international community, history
shows that democratic governments can defy the
international community in pursuit of nuclear
weapons. For example, the democratic regimes of
the Republic of India, the State of Israel, and the
Republic of South Africa have all developed
nuclear weapons in the past. There is no guarantee
a new Iranian regime would give up ambitions for
nuclear weapons.
Iranian opposition leaders have defended
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, but have stated
that they are open to reforming Iranian nuclear
policies. During the 2009 elections, Mir Hussein
Moussavi stated that if elected, he would be open to
negotiations with the United States if it changed its
policy towards Iran. He has said that “the
consequences of giving up the country’s nuclear
program would be irreparable and that the Iranian
people support the nuclear program” because the
program is “considered a source of national
pride.”77 His comments demonstrate an
unwillingness to give up nuclear development
entirely, but also openness to compromise on the
purpose of nuclear technology and on the degree of
international regulation. The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty does allow for Iran to develop
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and on
the basis of the treaty, diplomacy can be used to
halt Iranian production of nuclear arms. Diplomacy
can be used to enforce NPT stipulations. If the
current protests in Iran successfully lead to a
democratic regime, there is an opening for the U.S.
and Israel to work with Iran in order to prevent the
construction of nuclear weapons.
VIII. Conclusion
Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the fears of the
international community can be understood within
the framework of realism. Iran wants nuclear
weapons primarily for security purposes and to
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attain regional hegemony. These desires do not
necessarily pose dangers to the international
community. Nuclear proliferation isn’t inherently
dangerous, only the use of nuclear weapons is.
While the international community has been
primarily focused on how to stop its nuclear
program, the real concern ought to be to limit Iran’s
nuclear program to strictly peaceful purposes. To
ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains
peaceful, the reasons for its nuclear ambitions must
be addressed. Otherwise, Iran will continue its
nuclear program belligerently defiant of the
international community.
The best means of ensuring a peaceful nuclear
program would involve a combination of some of
the options presented. Sanctions are an important
aspect of any package of actions for preventing Iran
from developing nuclear weapons, but they cannot
be the only option. History shows the
ineffectiveness of solely relying on sanctions to
change undesirable behaviors. Current sanctions
on Iran limit its access to nuclear materials, and
also threaten the prospects for Iranian hegemony by
detaching it from the international community.
Despite these benefits of sanctions, they may be
detrimental to the average Iranian citizen. This is a
major concern brought up by some members of the
Security Council who fear that sanctions punish the
wrong entities. It may turn the Iranian public
against the international community, which can
stimulate Iranian nationalism against the outside
world. As such, all unilateral and multilateral
sanctions need to be targeted strictly against parts
of the nuclear program.
Covert operations should also be continued,
but done so more prudently. These operations can
effectively slow Iran’s nuclear development
without forcing Iran to retaliate. Insofar as Iran’s
nuclear program is a source of national pride,
publicly known attacks on the program may lead to
public desires for retributions, which can escalate
into war. In order to avoid this, covert operations
must be done more carefully. A very effective use
of covert operation would be to use it to lend
support to the Green Movement. With regime
change increasingly likely due to the state of affairs
in the Middle East, international powers can
empower protestors.
The Green Movement is no longer merely a
movement against the re-election of President
Ahmadinejad, but has taken on an ideological
fervor for democracy. The success of the Green
Movement will be tied to the success of similar
revolutions across the Middle East. Success in

countries like Libya and Syria will encourage
protesters in Iran. Covert aid to demonstrators can
help protect them from excessive governmental
force. The clandestine nature of this aid is very
important though because protests need to be
indigenous in order to succeed. Regime change
that doesn’t appear to be purely indigenous would
be quickly characterized as Western imperialism
and would give the Iranian regime greater
justification for its use of force.
Regime change to a democratic regime in Iran
is the best outcome for the international
community. Sanctions and covert operations
should try to encourage regime change in order to
directly address Iran’s nuclear weapons ambition.
A truly democratic Iran may not give up its nuclear
program entirely, but it will be open to better
relations and diplomacy with the West. This can
lead to greater international inspections and
regulations of Iran’s nuclear program to ensure that
it is for peaceful objectives. Beyond the issue of
nuclear proliferation, regime change would also be
very desirable to diffuse other pressing issues in the
Middle East that originate from the Iranian regime.
Ultimately if this fails, allowing Iran to
develop its nuclear program is better than the
option of preventive strikes Iranian nuclear
facilities. The risks associated with Iranian nuclear
weapons are insufficient in warranting preventive
strikes that will surely lead to a deadly war. Iran’s
vast military and association with terrorist
organizations make it a strong adversary in a war.
Preventive strikes are also unable to suppress the
ambition for nuclear weapons, but can only delay
its production. After a strike, Iran can rebuild and
resume a nuclear program more clandestinely. A
covert nuclear program would be much more
deadly than the current Iranian nuclear program
with its limited international oversight. The
dangers of Iran’s nuclear program are not as great
as is commonly perceived. While it is in the best
interest of the international community to prevent
Iran from developing nuclear weapons through
diplomacy and safe attacks on its program, if these
options fail, the international community must
come to terms with Iranian ambitions for nuclear
technology and possibly nuclear weapons.
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